The Unappreciated Congruity of the Second and Third Torts Reinstatements on Design Defects by Green, Michael D.
Brooklyn Law Review
Volume 74
Issue 3
SYMPOSIUM:
The Products Liability Restatement: Was it a
Success?
Article 8
2009
The Unappreciated Congruity of the Second and
Third Torts Reinstatements on Design Defects
Michael D. Green
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Law
Review by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Michael D. Green, The Unappreciated Congruity of the Second and Third Torts Reinstatements on Design Defects, 74 Brook. L. Rev. (2009).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr/vol74/iss3/8
807 
The Unappreciated Congruity of 
the Second and Third Torts 
Restatements on Design Defects 
Michael D. Green† 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Teaching products liability for the first time in 1980, I was 
baffled at how the California Supreme Court could have refused to 
provide more elaboration on the concept of defect.1 While its resistance 
to adopting the Restatement (Second)’s “defective condition 
unreasonably dangerous”2 language was understandable, even perhaps 
preferable, how could the court not have appreciated that the idea of a 
“defect” required elaboration in order for the fact finder to determine 
whether a product was sufficiently safe? Of course, eventually the 
California Supreme Court saw the light. In Barker v. Lull Engineering 
Co., it relented on its refusal to provide further specification for the 
concept of defect and provided a two-pronged test for determining if a 
product was defective in design.3 
I think now I understand the court’s reluctance to provide more, 
reflected in its early post-section 402A products liability jurisprudence. I 
also appreciate now why I failed to comprehend the court’s reticence. 
And the explanation for that appreciation sheds light on the Restatement 
(Third)4 and its treatment of design defects, a matter that has generated 
much controversy and significant criticism. That is the subject that I 
would like to pursue in this symposium’s reflection on the tenth 
anniversary of the Products Liability Restatement. 
  
 †  Williams Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law. The author thanks 
Brandon Barnes and Meredith Green for their diligent research assistance. The author is also 
indebted to Oscar Gray, who explained a central point in this Article in a taxicab in Philadelphia 
after an Advisers meeting for the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability. I am grateful as 
well for helpful comments at a faculty colloquium at Washington University School of Law and 
students in Professor Kim Norwood’s products liability class at Washington University. 
 1 Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153, 1162-63 (Cal. 1972). 
 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). 
 3  573 P.2d 443, 455-56 (Cal. 1978). 
 4  I refer to the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability alternatively as either 
Restatement (Third) or Products Liability Restatement in this Article. By contrast, I use Restatement 
(Third) of Torts to refer to the compendium of individual pieces, including the Products Liability 
Restatement, that will comprise the entirety of the third iteration of the torts Restatement. 
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This Article is not intended as an all-encompassing defense of 
the Restatement (Third)’s treatment of design defects.5 Rather its goal is 
more modest. What I hope to demonstrate, contrary to contending critics 
of the Restatement (Third), is the congruity between the law adopted in 
the Restatement (Third) and the law in the Restatement (Second). To do 
that, though, I will have to spend more time than I would have thought 
when I began this Article on the scope of the Restatement (Second) with 
regard to manufacturing defects and design defects.  
I begin in Part II of this Article by setting forth contending and 
conflicting claims about the scope of section 402A and its treatment of 
design defects. While one of those claims was made twenty years ago, 
well before the Restatement (Third) process began, it contends that 
section 402A was not about design defects. The conflicting claim, one 
raised vociferously during the drafting of the Restatement (Third), is that 
it fails to continue the strict liability reform of section 402A by 
abandoning consumer expectations as the basis for a design defect. Part 
III delves into the former claim, by Professor George Priest, that section 
402A was meant to apply only to manufacturing defects, leaving alleged 
design and warnings defects to be decided under a negligence standard. I 
reanalyze the evidence that Professor Priest amassed in support of his 
claim, both in the scholarship leading up to the adoption and approval of 
section 402A and in the structure of that section and its comments. 
Having found Priest’s claim wanting, Part IV proceeds to explain the 
consistency of the Restatement (Second) and Restatement (Third) in their 
treatment of design defects, a consistency that escapes critics on both 
sides of the claims identified in Part II.  
II.  THE CRITIQUE OF DESIGN DEFECTS IN THE PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY RESTATEMENT 
I do not attempt to address all of the criticism of the Products 
Liability Restatement’s treatment of design defects, but there are two 
competing themes that I pursue. One was first raised by George Priest, 
before we even knew that Products Liability would be the first piece of 
the Restatement (Third) of Torts. In 1989, Priest claimed that courts had 
strayed from what the founders intended and from what section 402A 
  
 5 For example, one might reasonably have thought that the design defect standard in 
section 2(b) of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability could have been more 
transparent about adopting a risk-utility standard. One might also have preferred placing the burden 
of proof on the foreseeability of risk on the defendant, on the grounds that it almost always exists in 
the case of durable goods. Actually, comment m to section 2 comes close to adopting such a 
placement in the burden of proof, despite black letter language that ignores the matter. See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. m (1998). And for those committed to 
compensation and loss spreading, there is no doubt that the Restatement (Third) represents a retreat 
from the apogee of the strict liability movement when courts struggled to define a regime for strict 
liability different from the reasonableness-balancing of negligence.  
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was intended to address.6 According to Priest, section 402A was limited 
to manufacturing defects and in extending strict liability beyond those 
kinds of defects to include design and warnings, courts had strayed from 
the original intent.7 Priest’s claim has more widespread contemporary 
acceptance than I had appreciated. At the symposium where the papers in 
this issue of the Brooklyn Law Review were presented, both Aaron 
Twerski and Hildy Bowbeer, the former a co-Reporter for the Products 
Liability Restatement and the latter a prominent products liability lawyer, 
repeated the claim that section 402A was meant to apply only to 
manufacturing defects. Professor Twerski has since disavowed that 
claim.8 In Priest’s view, design and warnings issues were to be left to 
  
 6 See George L. Priest, Strict Products Liability: The Original Intent, 10 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 2301, 2301-05 (1989). 
 7  Id. at 2303-04. 
 8 See Aaron D. Twerski & James A. Henderson, Jr., Manufacturers’ Liability for 
Defective Product Designs: The Triumph of Risk Utility, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1061 (2009). Scholars 
who have been misled by Priest’s claim over the years since his article was published include: 
Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived Case for Enterprise 
Liability, 91 MICH. L. REV. 683, 702 n.80 (1993); Larry E. Ribstein, The Mandatory Nature of the 
ALI Code, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 984, 1016 n.173 (1993); Paul H. Rubin & Martin J. Bailey, The 
Role of Lawyers in Changing the Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 807, 808 (1994); Peter L. Strauss, Courts 
or Tribunals? Federal Courts and the Common Law, 53 ALA. L. REV. 891, 920 (2002); Peter Nash 
Swisher, Products Liability Tort Reform: Why Virginia Should Adopt the Henderson-Twerski 
Proposed Revision of Section 402A, Restatement (Second) of Torts, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 857, 863 
n.28 (1993) (stating that the “authors of section 402A primarily focused” on manufacturing defects); 
Michael J. Tõke, Note, Categorical Liability for Manifestly Unreasonable Designs: Why the 
Comment d Caveat Should Be Removed from the Restatement (Third), 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 
1190 & n.48 (1996) (Section 402A “was intended to apply only to latent manufacturing defects.”); 
see also JANE STAPLETON, PRODUCT LIABILITY 25 & n.66 (1994) (citing Priest for the proposition 
that “the historical record suggests that the principal aim . . . was merely to make uniform and 
explicit the strict standard for manufacturing errors”); Mary J. Davis, Design Defect Liability: In 
Search of a Standard of Responsibility, 39 WAYNE L. REV. 1217, 1233 & n.50 (1993) (“Professor 
Priest argues persuasively that the mismanufactured product constituted the intended reach of strict 
liability under section 402A.”); Victor E. Schwartz & Rochelle M. Tedesco, The Re-emergence of 
“Super Strict” Liability: Slaying the Dragon Again, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 917, 923-24 & n.50 (2003) 
(lawyers who represent defendants’ interests stating that “several scholars” agree that section 402A 
is limited to manufacturing defects and citing Priest for that proposition). The American Law 
Institute’s Reporters’ Study also belongs on this list. See 2 AM. LAW INST., REPORTERS’ STUDY ON 
ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 35 & n.7 (1991) (noting that “the law explicitly 
authorized actions based on defects in manufacture”). 
  Douglas Kysar claims that the consumer expectations test in section 402A was not 
intended to address design defect litigation and cites Priest in support. See Douglas A. Kysar, The 
Expectations of Consumers, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1700, 1713 & n.53 (2003). I do not disagree with 
Kysar on that point, although his suggestion that all of the product failure cases were manufacturing 
defect cases is not supportable. See id. at 1714. By contrast, Richard Wright asserts that section 
402A “clearly was meant to encompass design and warning defects,” which is a tad misleading 
given the lack of attention by the founders to the source of the defect, a matter that Wright 
acknowledges and appreciates. See Richard W. Wright, The Principles of Product Liability, 26 REV. 
LITIG. 1067, 1068-69 (2007). 
  Rick Cupp and Bob Rabin share my view that the founders and early courts were 
simply not thinking in terms of specific kinds of defects. See Richard L. Cupp Jr. & Danielle Polage, 
The Rhetoric of Strict Products Liability Versus Negligence: An Empirical Analysis, 77 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 874, 889-90 (2002); Robert L. Rabin, Restating the Law: The Dilemmas of Products Liability, 
30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 197, 202-03 (1997); see also Gary T. Schwartz, Considering the Proper 
Federal Role in American Tort Law, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 917, 947 & n.185 (1996).  
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negligence.9 While Priest was not speaking to the next-generation 
Restatement, the implications of his critique would be an important 
consideration for any effort to draft the next Restatement treatment of 
products liability.  
The second critique is of the design defect standard in section 
2(b) of the Restatement (Third). That subsection mandates that a 
reasonable alternative design be demonstrated in order to prove a design 
defect exists.10 Once the plaintiff identifies an alternative design, the jury 
must compare the additional risks that the alternative design can 
eliminate from the existing design with the additional costs entailed in 
adopting the alternative design. This risk-utility standard is, frankly, one 
that reflects a negligence balancing.  
Although many commentators have raised criticisms about the 
Restatement (Third)’s treatment of design defects, I focus here on those 
that decry the Restatement (Third) for abandoning the strict liability 
adopted in section 402A and its use of consumer expectations as the 
basis for determining defectiveness. Ellen Wertheimer, a products 
liability scholar, has written extensively on the failed promise of the 
Restatement (Second) in the provisions of the Restatement (Third).11 She 
has argued that requiring proof of a reasonable alternative design and 
that the existing design fails a risk-utility test12 materially changes the 
standard for strict liability set out in the Restatement (Second).13 
Similarly, Frank Vandall has charged that the reasonable alternative 
design requirement violates the core of what section 402A was about,14 
especially cases like Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.15 
Frequently, these critics have also asserted that the Reporters for the 
Restatement (Third) failed to follow the design defect jurisprudence that 
developed after widespread acceptance of strict products liability, which 
  
 9 See Priest, supra note 6, at 2303. 
 10 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) (1998). 
 11 See infra note 13. 
 12 Contrary to the implications of what Wertheimer wrote, these are not two independent 
requirements. One cannot assess risk-utility for a given design without an alternative design by 
which to frame the risk-utility analysis. See Michael D. Green, The Schizophrenia of Risk-Benefit 
Analysis in Design Defect Litigation, 48 VAND. L. REV. 609, 616-17 (1995). 
 13 See Ellen Wertheimer, The Third Restatement of Torts: An Unreasonably Dangerous 
Doctrine, 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1235, 1251-52, 1255 (1994); see also Ellen Wertheimer, The 
Smoke Gets in Their Eyes: Product Category Liability and Alternative Feasible Designs in the Third 
Restatement, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1429, 1431-32 (1994) (“The Restatement (Third), however, 
materially increases the plaintiff’s burden by requiring that the plaintiff show not only that the 
product fails a risk-utility test, but also that an alternative feasible design existed at the time of 
manufacture and that the manufacturer should have used that alternative design.”). 
 14 See Frank J. Vandall, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability Section 
2(b): The Reasonable Alternative Design Requirement, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1407, 1407, 1423 (1994) 
(stating that the Restatement (Third) proposes a “radical restructuring” of existing products liability 
theory).  
 15  377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963). 
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has not, for the most part, insisted on proof of a reasonable alternative 
design.16 
Rather than engage now with this strain of criticism, I return to 
the conflicting Priest position. If Professor Priest is right, then criticism 
of the Restatement (Third) for adopting a negligence standard for design 
defects at least should appreciate that the Restatement (Third) remains 
true to the original reform exemplified in section 402A. Indeed, one 
might say that the Restatement (Third) returns us from a frolic and detour 
in which many courts engaged in the years after section 402A. During 
this period, courts struggled to find a form of “strict liability” to impose 
on products that was different from the extant negligence regime that 
operated before section 402A was adopted. If Priest’s hypothesis that 
section 402A limited strict liability to manufacturing defects is correct, 
then employing consumer expectations to determine how safe a product 
should be made, imputing knowledge of dangers that were unknown at 
the time of manufacture and sale, and similar steps were mistaken efforts 
that went beyond the more modest intentions of section 402A. In 
addition, the Restatement (Third) strays from its predecessor in 
permitting an inference of defect from the circumstances surrounding the 
product’s performance regardless of whether the source of the defect is 
one of design or manufacture.17  
III.  THE PRIEST HYPOTHESIS 
Professor Priest relies on two sources of evidence in support of 
his theory that section 402A was intended to be limited to manufacturing 
defects. The first is the academic literature leading up to the adoption of 
section 402A, which was published by Prosser, the Reporter for the 
Restatement (Second),18 the Advisers for the Restatement (Second) of 
  
 16  See Roland F. Banks & Margaret O’Connor, Commentary, Restating the Restatement 
(Second), Section 402A—Design Defect, 72 OR. L. REV. 411, 412 (1993) (observing that the 
“definition of design defect” in the Restatement (Third) is a “substantial change” from section 402A 
of the Restatement (Second)); John F. Vargo, Caveat Emptor: Will the A.L.I. Erode Strict Liability in 
the Restatement (Third) for Products Liability?, 10 TOURO L. REV. 21, 21 n.1, 22 n.2, 37-38 (1993) 
(noting that the Restatement (Third) substitutes negligence for strict liability of Restatement 
(Second)); Note, Just What You’d Expect: Professor Henderson’s Redesign of Products Liability, 
111 HARV. L. REV. 2366, 2368 (1998); Patrick Lavelle, Comment, Crashing into Proof of a 
Reasonable Alternative Design: The Fallacy of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 
38 DUQ. L. REV. 1059, 1064-67, 1100-01 (2000) (accusing products liability Restatement of 
partisanship in favoring defendants and turning its back on the strict liability rules and policies 
contained in section 402A); Matthew R. Sorenson, Comment, A Reasonable Alternative? Should 
Wyoming Adopt the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability?, 3 WYO. L. REV. 257, 283 
(2003) (“By . . . requiring the plaintiff to prove a reasonable alternative design, the Restatement 
(Third) moved far from the strict liability standard set out in Section 402A of the Restatement 
(Second).”). 
 17 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 3 (1998). 
 18 Prosser subsequently resigned as Reporter shortly before his death, and John Wade 
took over Reporter duties. Prosser was the Reporter at the time that section 402A was proposed and 
approved. See Herbert W. Titus, Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402 and the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 22 STAN. L. REV. 713, 713 (1970). 
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Torts, and a small group of fellow travelers who were writing about 
products liability in the 1950s and early 1960s.19 The second source of 
evidence is the structure of section 402A and its commentary, which 
reflect, on Priest’s account, an assumption that the strict liability being 
described is limited to manufacturing defects (even if that terminology 
was not employed at the time).  
A.  The Founders’ Views 
I understand Priest’s claim to be about the intent of the founders 
with regard to section 402A and not what the state of the law was in 
1964 when section 402A was approved. As is well-known, section 402A 
was not a “restatement” of existing law. Rather, it reflected 
dissatisfaction with the existing state of the law that posed so many 
obstacles to establishing liability for dangerous products that caused 
harm. Prosser and the other founders conceived of section 402A as a 
means to transport the strict liability of implied warranty into tort law, 
stripping warranty of its contract impediments in the process. Relying on 
the slim foundation of contaminated food and riding the wave of a couple 
of late-breaking cases, Prosser forged section 402A as a progressive 
reform rather than a statement of existing law.20 Thus, the evidence 
relevant to Priest’s hypothesis is the normative positions of the 
founders—not their descriptive accounts of existing law. 
Let me provide a contending theory of what was behind section 
402A before proceeding to critique the Priest hypothesis. The strict 
liability proposed by section 402A was not limited to manufacturing 
defects. Indeed, that section, influenced by its warranty heritage—the 
then-existing source of strict liability in the law—employed a conceptual 
framework independent of specific types of defect.21 Rather than the 
familiar three-defect world in which we find ourselves today, section 
402A contemplated a performance-based idea for defect. If a product 
performed in a way that revealed a defect—regardless of its source—
then it was defective. Thus, if a gun went off when being held by its 
owner without the owner engaging its trigger, the gun was defective and 
we need not trace the source of that defect. It is this alternative to the 
Priest manufacturing-defect theory that better accounts, in my view, for 
the evidence relating to what was intended in section 402A. 
  
 19  In addition to William Prosser, these commentators, all academics save for Justice 
Roger Traynor, include Dix Noel, Page Keeton, Fleming James, John Wade, and Traynor. These 
were all leading torts commentators in the middle of the twentieth century. 
 20 See, e.g., Titus, supra note 18, at 713-15; see also George L. Priest, The Invention of 
Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 461, 514-17 (1985) (criticizing Reporter Prosser for his exaggeration in extending his 
draft of section 402A to all products). 
 21  See Cupp & Polage, supra note 8, at 889-90; Rabin, supra note 8, at 202-03; Schwartz, 
supra note 8, at 947 & n.185. 
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Before proceeding, let me point out one aspect of agreement 
between my explanation and Priest’s. Section 402A was not about 
employing strict liability to determine how safe a product should be 
designed, the modern version of design defect litigation that emerged 
after courts accepted section 402A. I should explain that we can virtually 
always design a durable good to be marginally safer. A guard can be 
added to the pinch point of an industrial machine. If the guard is 
removable for maintenance purposes, then an interlock could be added to 
prevent use of the machine without the guard. We could extend this 
safety-for-cost tradeoff to extremes: cars, for example, could be designed 
like tanks and thereby eliminate almost all of the 40,000 traffic-related 
deaths and over two million personal injuries suffered each year by those 
riding on the nation’s highways.22 Nobody thought that section 402A 
would provide the metric for deciding how much safety should be built 
into industrial machinery or automobiles. At the same time, I do not 
think that section 402A was meant to be limited to manufacturing 
defects. 
Priest explains his theory that section 402A was to be so limited 
and that negligence was to remain the regime for warnings and design 
defect cases,23 writing:  
[T]he founders did not fully appreciate the distinctions among manufacturing 
defects, design defects, and defective warnings that would become the 
centerpiece of modern law. Section 402A represented only a limited change in 
the law because the founders intended the Section’s strict liability standard, 
with minor exceptions, to apply only to what we now call manufacturing defect 
cases.24  
The first notable matter about Priest’s claim is the logical 
inconsistency between the idea that the founders did not have a clear 
grasp of the three different kinds of defects and the claim that they 
intended to apply strict liability only to manufacturing defect cases. If the 
founders did not clearly know what a manufacturing defect is—not a 
difficult concept25—or the ways in which it is different from a design or 
  
 22 The data reflect the toll during the year 2007. See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC AND 
SAFETY ADMIN., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATISTICS AND ANALYSIS, TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS 1 (2008), 
available at http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/portal/nhtsa_static_file_downloader.jsp?file=/staticfiles/DOT/ 
NHTSA/NCSA/Content/RNotes/2008/811017.pdf. 
 23 See Priest, supra note 6, at 2303. 
 24 Id. at 2303; see also id. at 2308 (“The cases for which the founders believed 
consumers deserved automatic recovery are what we now call manufacturing or production defect 
cases in which the injury to the consumer was caused by a deviation from the manufacturer’s own 
standards of production or quality control. We shall see in a moment that the Restatement and its 
Comments make sole reference to manufacturing defect cases.”). 
  Priest does not return to or explain the “minor exceptions” to which he adverts in the 
quoted language nor does he explain the discrepancy between the language quoted in the text and the 
language quoted in the prior paragraph, which is not qualified with any “exceptions.” 
 25 The Restatement (Third) explains a manufacturing defect as one that occurs when the 
product “departs from its intended design.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(a) 
(1998). That definition is similar to one provided by Page Keeton in the academic literature 
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informational defect, how could they have intended to limit strict liability 
to a type of defect that they did not fully understand? A second aspect of 
Priest’s claim that requires careful attention is the difference between a 
type of defect—manufacturing defects—serving as the model for strict 
liability and the idea that strict liability was limited to those kinds of 
defects. There is no doubt, as explained below, that contaminated food 
was the ballast on which strict products liability was developed. Whether 
that means it was so limited to that kind of defect is a different question, 
a distinction that Professor Priest tends to ignore.26 
But there is not much to Priest’s claim that the founders did not 
understand the idea of a design or warning defect—putting aside for the 
moment whether they intended strict liability to apply to it.27 As Priest’s 
own research revealed, academics of the day discussed liability for 
negligent design, so they were cognizant of the notion that defects might 
have different sources, including the manner in which products were 
designed.28 Indeed, Dix Noel wrote an article, published in the Yale Law 
Journal, that assessed manufacturers’ liability for design and warnings 
defects.29 That article reveals a thriving trade in cases confronting the 
question under negligence law of how safe a product should be designed. 
The idea of liability for a manufacturer whose design is negligent is even 
ensconced in a black letter section of the first Restatement of Torts.30 And 
Prosser had already prepared a draft of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
that contained a similar provision.31 Dillard and Hart wrote an early 
important article on inadequate warnings as the basis for a seller’s 
liability.32 Others, who may not have used the term “manufacturing 
defect,” nevertheless described the concept.33 
  
preceding the adoption of section 402A: “The product was not in all respects as it was intended to be 
or as the purchaser or user expected it to be.” Page Keeton, Products Liability—Liability Without 
Fault and the Requirement of a Defect, 41 TEX. L. REV. 855, 859 (1963). 
 26 Thus, for example, Priest claims that Roger Traynor believed that strict liability in 
section 402A was limited to manufacturing defects. Priest, supra note 6, at 2314. But his evidence 
for that proposition is that Traynor was thinking about such defects when he wrote about strict 
liability in a 1965 article. Id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 60-67. 
 27 Another error concerns Priest’s claim that “none of the founders at the time had 
focused clearly on design problems as ‘defects,’” Priest, supra note 6, at 2315 n.60, yet John Wade 
did exactly that in an article that Priest discusses. Id. at 2313 (“Wade believes that more difficult 
problems [than with manufacturing defects] arise where the product . . . incorporates a dangerous 
design.”). 
 28 Fleming James, Jr., Products Liability (pt.1), 34 TEX. L. REV. 44, 50 (1955). 
 29 Dix W. Noel, Manufacturer’s Negligence of Design or Directions for Use of a 
Product, 71 YALE L.J. 816, 816-17 (1962). 
 30 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 398 (1934). 
 31 Section 398 in the Restatement (Second) broadened the first Restatement’s treatment 
modestly by extending its protection to all who might be expected to be endangered by the product 
instead of the first Restatement’s limitation to those expected to be “in the vicinity.” RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 398 (Prelim. Draft No. 6, 1958). 
 32 Hardy Cross Dillard & Harris Hart, II, Product Liability: Directions for Use and the 
Duty to Warn, 41 VA. L. REV. 145, 146-47 (1955). 
 33  See Keeton, supra note 25, at 859 (describing a situation where the “product was 
different from products of like kind” and “[t]here was a miscarriage in the manufacturing process”). 
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Yet, in a curious and oblique way, there is something to Priest’s 
claim: one does not readily find references to the different types of 
design defects in the Restatement or in the writings in the run-up to its 
adoption. However, my interpretation of that evidence is that rather than 
not appreciating these concepts, the Restatement and the founders did not 
consider them to be of importance. 
Thus, most of the normative academic attention of the day was 
not about the standard for strict liability, as Priest explains.34 Instead, 
most academics were concerned with the various impediments to 
imposing liability—such as the privity barrier and other warranty law 
limitations—rather than the substantive standard by which products 
would be judged. Prosser, in his classic Assault Upon the Citadel article, 
in which he was working out the scope of section 402A, spent a great 
deal of time addressing which products and defendants would be subject 
to strict liability, which plaintiffs could recover, and what defenses might 
be available, but barely adverted to the standard by which defectiveness 
would be determined.35  
  
 34  Priest, supra note 6, at 2305-08. 
 35  William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 
69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1110-11, 1114-20 (1960). By the time he first revised his torts treatise after the 
publication of section 402A (and after cases had been decided on the matter), Prosser wrote that 
section 402A applied as well to design defect cases. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE 
LAW OF TORTS § 99, at 659 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter PROSSER, HANDBOOK (4th ed.)]. But 
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963), one of the cases on which this 
statement was based, was pre-section 402A. Friedrich Kessler, another academic observer—one who 
Professor Priest credits as being among the three most influential scholars in the intellectual history 
of strict products liability—remarked two years after section 402A was published that it applied not 
only to manufacturing defects but to design defects as well as informational deficiencies. See 
Friedrich Kessler, Products Liability, 76 YALE L.J. 887, 900 & n.71, 901 (1967); George L. Priest, 
The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern 
Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 492, 494-95 (1985). Priest does, however, explain that Kessler’s 
concern was with shifting influence away from contract law rather than with the question of 
defectiveness. See Priest, supra, at 493-94. 
  Professors Henderson and Twerski, in their effort to justify a risk-benefit standard for 
design defects in the Restatement (Third), accept Priest’s characterization of Prosser and cite 
Prosser’s discussion of negligent design in his 1971 treatise as support. See James A. Henderson, Jr. 
& Aaron D. Twerski, Product Design Liability in Oregon and the New Restatement, 78 OR. L. REV. 
1, 11 n.32, 24 & n.94 (1999) [hereinafter Henderson & Twerski, Product Design Liability in 
Oregon]; James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Arriving at Reasonable Alternative Design: 
The Reporters’ Travelogue, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 563, 569 & n.11, 572 & n.16 (1997) 
[hereinafter Henderson & Twerski, Arriving at a Reasonable Alternative Design]. If they had limited 
their claim to assert that Prosser did not address whether consumer expectations should be applied to 
modern design defect litigation that raises the issue of how safe a product should be designed, I think 
they would have been correct. However, they did not, instead asserting that Prosser “emphatically 
rejects” use of consumer expectations for design defect cases. See Henderson & Twerski, Product 
Design Liability in Oregon, supra, at 24. Prosser contributed to their reading of him with a slapdash 
and inconsistent revision of the third edition of his treatise, which was written before the adoption of 
section 402A, and the fourth edition, which was written after. Compare WILLIAM L. PROSSER, 
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 96, 99 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter PROSSER, HANDBOOK (3d 
ed.)] with PROSSER, HANDBOOK (4th ed.), supra, §§ 96, 99. In the midst of the discussion of 
negligent design carried forward from the third edition, Prosser inserted several paragraphs about 
strict liability and added that “the tort is essentially a matter of negligence,” before proceeding to 
explain the sort of balancing that would be relevant in a negligent design case. PROSSER, HANDBOOK 
(4th ed.), supra, § 96, at 644-45. A dozen pages later, Prosser inserted a new section on “Strict 
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To be sure, most of the cases Prosser cited and discussed 
involved food contaminated with impurities.36 These are the edible 
equivalent of manufacturing defects, containing an aspect that is not 
intended by the preparer. Food was the first product subject to strict 
liability, and those cases contributed much of the precedential fodder on 
which Prosser and his fellow travelers relied. Yet nowhere does Prosser 
identify these contaminated-food cases as ones involving manufacturing 
defects or even as instances of deviation from the preparer’s intentions. 
So, the fact that the predominant cases of the day were food and 
involved impurities supports the idea that strict liability would include 
manufacturing defects but it does not mean that other kinds of defects 
were meant to be excluded. Page Keeton, the academic of the day who 
seems to have thought most deeply and published the most about the 
substance of what a defect might encompass, identified, in a 1963 article, 
two classes of cases that might be subject to strict liability: 1) products 
having an aspect unintended by and unknown to the manufacturer; and 2) 
products that pose a danger because of essential characteristics of the 
product.37 Priest claims that Keeton’s first category is manufacturing 
defects, and the second category is not design defects, but a class of 
cases that have come to be known as “unavoidably unsafe products,”38 
rather than design defect cases.  
Priest is surely right that the second category does not reflect 
classic design defect cases. Yet it does involve defectiveness on a basis 
other than a manufacturing defect: these products are made precisely in 
the fashion intended by the manufacturer. Priest nevertheless finds 
Keeton’s discussion supportive because, “according to Keeton, strict 
liability is only appropriate for the first category of defects 
(manufacturing defects).”39 Instead, says Priest, Keeton contemplated 
that the second-category manufacturers would only be subject to liability 
for negligence.40 This, then, would limit strict liability to the first 
category, manufacturing defects. The problem with Priest’s claim is that 
Keeton did not conclude that strict liability should be inapplicable to the 
second category of products. Instead, he distinguished between socially 
valuable products, such as prescription drugs, and others, such as 
  
Liability in Tort,” that contains the assertion above that section 402A applies to design cases. See 
PROSSER, HANDBOOK (4th ed.), supra, § 96, at 659. In contrast to their acceptance of Prosser’s 
“emphatic rejection,” Professors Henderson and Twerski have acknowledged that section 402A was 
not drafted to exclude non-manufacturing defects. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, 
Achieving Consensus on Defective Product Design, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 867, 879 (1998) 
[hereinafter Henderson & Twerski, Achieving Consensus]. They assert that section 402A failed, 
however, to confront the question of whether strict liability should be applied to the modern form of 
design defect litigation, which requires consideration of whether a marginally safer product should 
have been produced by changing its design in some fashion. See id. at 879-80.  
 36  Prosser, supra note 35, at 1103-10. 
 37 See Keeton, supra note 25, at 859.  
 38  Priest, supra note 6, at 2310-11. 
 39 Id. at 2311. 
 40  See id. 
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cosmetics, alcohol, and cigarettes for which Keeton allowed that it “may 
be sound social policy”41 to extend the implied warranty to those who are 
injured in using the product as a matter of loss distribution.42 Thus, the 
founder who most deeply considered the standard for defectiveness 
contemplated extending strict liability beyond manufacturing defects, 
even if not in such terms nor in terms of modern-day design defects.43  
Keeton was not alone. In his article on liability for design 
defects, Dix Noel briefly considered the notion of applying the emerging 
strict liability standard for foodstuffs to durable goods.44 Priest writes of 
Noel’s work that he “presumed that the negligence standard was the most 
appropriate way of considering the design issue.”45 Yet, Noel’s 1962 
article in the Yale Law Journal was descriptive, not normative, and so, of 
course, would explain liability for design in terms of negligence, the 
applicable standard at the time. At the conclusion of his article, Noel 
addresses strict liability for design defects.46 Priest finds this discussion 
to be dismissive of the idea: Noel is “incredulous” that a jet plane whose 
wing is torn off despite the best efforts of the manufacturer could be 
defectively designed; he “sarcastically” asks about the strict liability of 
cigarette manufacturers who produced cigarettes at a time no one knew 
of their dangers and is “incredulous” about the possibility.47  
I do not read Noel in any such way. His discussion is 
predominantly inquisitorial rather than normative. In referring to 
cigarettes and state of the art jet airplanes, Noel sought to focus on the 
issues that would have to be confronted if strict liability were employed 
to address how safely products should be designed. In lawyerly fashion, 
Noel tested the limits that would have to be addressed if strict liability 
for design were employed. Far from being aghast at the possibility of 
  
 41  Keeton, supra note 25, at 872. 
 42 Keeton wrote: 
If the warranty does extend to each particular user that he will suffer no injury, then the 
position in essence seems to be that the many who benefit from the use of cigarettes, 
whiskey, cosmetics, and drugs are paying for the tragic injuries to the few. This may be 
sound social policy if it be assumed that the industry will be able to do this without 
impairing the normal incentive to bring out new products and without serious effect on 
the economic well-being of an industry that is important to the economy and to society. 
Whiskey, cigarettes, and cosmetics seem to be indistinguishable from the standpoint of 
what the courts should do. On the other hand, drugs and medicines may well be put in a 
different category.  
Id.  
 43 Even Keeton’s first category was not exclusively limited to products that did not 
conform with the manufacturer’s intentions. Priest quotes Keeton, “[I]n this situation the product 
was different from products of like kind,” but omits the first word of the sentence. Priest, supra note 
6, at 2310 (quoting Keeton, supra note 25, 859) (internal quotation marks omitted). That word is 
“generally.” Keeton, supra note 25, at 859. Nowhere in the remainder of his article does Keeton 
explain the reason for the “generally” qualification. 
 44  Noel, supra note 29, at 877. 
 45 Priest, supra note 6, at 2312. 
 46  Noel, supra note 29, at 877. 
 47  Priest, supra note 6, at 2312. 
818 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:3  
liability in that situation, Noel identified the conflicting tensions: 
“Perhaps liability even in this situation would be a useful means of 
spreading the loss; but that holding might unduly discourage the 
development of useful new products.”48 While Noel was cautious about 
the matter of strict liability for design, I do not read him as shrinking 
from the prospect but rather as identifying the issues that would have to 
be confronted if strict liability were so extended. 
Priest cites two other articles by Noel.49 Priest finds in them 
Noel’s “insist[ence] on negligence as the appropriate standard for design-
related injuries.”50 One of those articles reflects a presentation for 
lawyers sponsored by the Practising Law Institute and does not have a 
normative bone in its body.51 Far from stating his views on the proper 
role for strict liability, Noel took on the task of educating his audience on 
the expansion of negligence-based claims to product manufacturers. 
Much of the content was drawn from the second publication, also 
stemming from a presentation to lawyers, at an event sponsored by the 
Southwestern Legal Foundation.52 That article is a rehash of the Yale Law 
Journal article he had previously written and again has only descriptive 
goals. Noel presented the cases in which negligence had been applied to 
product design, after observing that while strict liability is the more 
spectacular development, the expansion of negligence in its application 
to products liability is worthy of attention in its own right.53 Nowhere in 
either of these articles can one find an expression of Noel’s views about 
strict liability being applied to design defects, Priest’s claims 
notwithstanding. 
Priest’s treatment of Fleming James’s work is no more 
illuminating of James’s views than Priest’s characterization of Noel’s. 
Priest writes that James’s two-part article on products liability limited 
treatment of design defects to negligence.54 Yes, in a 1955 survey of 
products liability, James, in Part I, which was devoted to negligence 
liability, discussed manufacturers’ liability for negligent design.55 No, he 
did not say anything there about strict liability for design defects, but 
then he did not say anything about strict liability for any kind of defect 
  
 48 Noel, supra note 29, at 877. 
 49  Priest, supra note 6, at 2313. 
 50 Id. 
 51  Dix Noel, Manufacturers’ Liability for Negligence, 33 TENN. L. REV. 444 (1966).  
 52 Dix Noel, Recent Trends in Manufacturers’ Negligence as to Design, Instructions or 
Warnings, 19 SW. L.J. 43 (1965). The presentation that Noel made was at what was designated a 
“Symposium,” at which at least three other academics spoke. Yet, based both on the content of the 
papers presented and the organization sponsoring the “Symposium,” this event was a continuing 
education program for lawyers rather than an academic event. The Southwestern Legal Foundation, 
a predecessor to the Center for American and International Law, had a mission of educating 
domestic and international lawyers.  
 53  Id. at 56-60.  
 54  Priest, supra note 6, at 2311.  
 55 See generally James, supra note 28.  
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because that Part was about negligence liability. Yet in Part II, which 
addresses manufacturers’ liability in implied warranty, James did 
consider strict liability. While he wrote that the standards for liability in 
implied warranty and negligence were “[b]y and large” the same,56 he 
was, consistent with his survey mission, attempting to describe the state 
of the law rather than his views. And although he did not explicitly 
address liability for design defects under implied warranty, James did 
cite cases in which the basis for the alleged defect was not a 
manufacturing defect.57 For example, when discussing a case in which 
the risk posed by a chemical—its air dispersal qualities, which were 
unknown—was not a manufacturing defect, James did not shrink from 
imposing liability:  
This would mean that when unexpected dangers develop from the use of a 
valuable new product, the industry producing it (and so, ultimately, all the 
beneficiaries of the product) would have to compensate the innocent victims of 
those dangers. This is a far better solution than the alternative of making each 
individual victim contribute the whole of his loss to this advancement of the 
arts . . . .58  
Thus, James reflects his longstanding preference for 
redistributing personal injury losses, here through the mechanism of 
strict liability for a (non-manufacturing) defect.  
A passage in a 1957 publication contains an even more 
illuminating example of James’s normative views about the proper scope 
of strict liability. In a presentation at an Association of American Law 
Schools program, James advocated strict liability for all products that 
were unreasonably dangerous at the time of sale.59 Although others were 
not as sweeping in endorsing strict liability as James, they also 
contemplated its application in cases beyond pure manufacturing defects. 
I do not understand how Priest could characterize Roger Traynor 
as believing that strict liability was limited to manufacturing defects 
based on Traynor’s 1965 article, The Ways and Meanings of Defective 
Products and Strict Liability.60 As Priest states, Traynor does suggest that 
a “deviation from the norm standard” may be overbroad in the case of 
unavoidably unsafe products, such as blood contaminated with the 
hepatitis virus.61 Yet, in the same discussion, Traynor suggests that some 
  
 56 Fleming James, Jr., Products Liability (pt. 2), 34 TEX. L. REV. 192, 206 (1955). 
 57 Id. at 213-15, 221-23.  
 58 Id. 
 59 Fleming James, Jr., General Products—Should Manufacturers Be Liable Without 
Negligence?, 24 TENN. L. REV. 923, 923 (1957). Priest does cite this article in a footnote in a 
different and later section of his article, acknowledging that James would include design defects in 
his strict liability scheme. Priest, supra note 6, at 2321 n.77. That contrasts with his earlier statement 
that James’ 1955 survey “discussed design questions solely in terms of negligence.” Id. at 2311. 
 60 Priest, supra note 6, at 2314. Traynor’s article is Roger J. Traynor, The Ways and 
Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363 (1965).  
 61  Priest, supra note 6, at 2314 (citing Traynor, supra note 60, at 367-68) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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drugs “of uniform quality” are defective under section 402A if their risks 
outweigh their benefits.62 This is strict liability for design defects writ 
large—the entire product fails a cost-benefit test.63 Traynor does little to 
disguise his approval for such a result, although he was a member of the 
Supreme Court of California at the time. Even Traynor’s concept of 
deviation from the norm is subtly different from manufacturing defects, 
for which the basis of comparison is the same product as intended by the 
manufacturer. Traynor envisions that the deviation could be from similar 
products made by other manufacturers.64 Such a test would include 
defects that we understand today as design defects, although Priest fails 
to recognize or acknowledge this.65 Going beyond deviation from the 
norm, Traynor proffers the idea that products can be defective because 
their danger is a surprise.66 Thus, Traynor expresses sympathy for strict 
liability for products like cigarettes at a time before their dangers were 
understood.67  
John Wade’s views on defective design are illuminating for a 
number of reasons. First, his thoughts in a 1965 paper belie Priest’s claim 
that none of the founders were thinking about strict liability for design 
defects. On the contrary, Wade observed that while manufacturing 
defects could readily be determined, the “more difficult problem[s]” 
were with dangerous products that were “made in the way . . . 
intended . . . and in the condition planned,”68 namely design defects. 
Wade suggests that the standard should focus on the dangerousness of 
the product and whether it is “not reasonably safe.”69 At the same time, 
given the familiar negligence “reasonable-person” standard, Wade claims 
that his product-focused standard can be converted to a conduct-based 
rule by asking if the manufacturer would have acted reasonably by 
putting the product on the market.70 Priest rightly quotes Wade’s 
comment that this rule “is simply a test of negligence.”71 What Priest 
  
 62  Traynor, supra note 60, at 368-69. 
 63 One might, I suppose, claim that this is nothing more than a negligence standard 
applied to the product overall, but no one had thought that negligence might be so employed prior to 
and even in the aftermath of section 402A. The idea of categorical liability for a product whose 
dangers exceed its benefits was borne of the adoption of strict products liability.  
 64 See Traynor, supra note 60, at 367. That Traynor was thinking about the design of 
similar products by other manufacturers is revealed in his comparison of the challenged product to 
“the average quality of like products.” Id. Thus, Priest ignores this nuance in claiming that Traynor 
describes Greenman as a manufacturing defect case. 
 65 Priest asserts that “Traynor clearly has manufacturing defects in mind” in this 
explanation of defects. Priest, supra note 6, at 2314. 
 66  Traynor, supra note 60, at 370. 
 67 Id. at 370-71, 374 (discussing aspirin’s defectiveness before its risks were understood). 
 68 John W. Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 SW. L.J. 5, 14 (1965). 
 69  Id. at 15. 
 70  Id. 
 71 Id. Wade was one of the stalwarts opposed to the use of consumer expectations 
because he was concerned that in many cases there would not be any relevant expectations by which 
to determine defectiveness as well as by the test’s treatment of latent dangers. See John W. Wade, 
On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISS. L.J. 825, 829 (1973); see also Richard 
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omits is that Wade had a clear idea of how his test was different from 
negligence, as immediately after the acknowledgment quoted above, 
Wade states: “In strict liability, except for the element of defendant’s 
scienter, the test is the same as that for negligence.”72 In other words, 
rather than proving the foreseeability of risk, Wade developed his 
famous imputation-of-knowledge standard for strict products liability.73 
The issue was whether a manufacturer who knew of the dangerous 
condition in the product would put it on the market, thereby eliminating 
the matter of foreseeability, a central concept in negligence claims. 
Wade’s foreseeability-free standard for design defectiveness is, thus, not 
the same as negligence, as we dramatically discovered when products 
whose risks were unknowable at the time of manufacture appeared front-
and-center on the products liability stage. 
Wade reiterated his views eight years later in an article published 
in the Mississippi Law Review in 1973,74 which is probably the “single 
most influential” article on how courts understand strict products liability 
and give content to the defectiveness concept.75 In that article, he 
articulated a seven factor test for strict products liability.76 This test, 
which was not limited to any specific kind of defect, largely reflected 
risk-utility concerns that courts have relied on since. Responding to the 
anticipated criticism that his seven factors were simply a negligence test, 
Wade argued that this was much like the strict liability of negligence per 
se in that the fault of the defendant was irrelevant and concluded that 
  
L. Cupp, Jr., Defining the Boundaries of “Alternative Design” Under the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts: The Nature and Role of Substitute Products in Design Defect Analysis, 63 TENN. L. REV. 329, 
340 (1996). 
 72 Wade, supra note 68, at 15. 
 73 Whether Wade truly meant that knowledge of the danger would be imputed when the 
danger was unknowable arose later when courts confronted that question in a variety of toxic 
substances litigation. See, e.g., Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 376 (N.J. 1984); Beshada v. 
Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 542 (N.J. 1982). Ultimately, he retreated from the 
strongest imputation position. See John W. Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge 
Unavailable Prior to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 734, 764 (1983). 
 74 Wade, supra note 71. 
 75  
The article in which Wade advocated a risk-benefit standard by which to judge design 
defects has been described by others as “‘[t]he single most influential piece of guiding 
scholarship’ in the period . . . when [product defect] was being defined and expanded.” 
LOUIS R. FRUMER & MELVIN I. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1.02 n.26 (2008) 
(quoting, in part, David G. Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 
VAND. L. REV. 681, 682 (1980)). 
Green, supra note 12, at 614 n.29; see also Richard A. Epstein, Intuition, Custom, and Protocol: 
How to Make Sound Decisions with Limited Knowledge, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 1, 25 (2006) 
(stating that the Wade factors have “exerted immense influence over judicial decisions”); Kysar, 
supra note 8, at 1712 (calling Wade’s article “highly influential”); Rabin, supra note 8, at 206 n.45 
(describing Wade’s test as “widely noted”); Jane Stapleton, Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products 
Liability, an Anglo-Australian Perspective, 39 WASHBURN L.J. 363, 395 n.117 (2000) (calling 
Wade’s article “influential”); W. Kip Viscusi, Wading Through the Muddle of Risk-Utility Analysis, 
39 AM. U. L. REV. 573, 578 (1990) (stating that “Wade’s seven factors have played . . . a dominant 
role in the liability literature”). 
 76  Wade, supra note 71, at 837-38. 
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courts should be honest about what they were doing: “If by doing this it 
is really establishing strict liability, we might as well call it that and be 
accurate.”77 
I had previously been critical of that test as a test for a design 
defect, not because it was or was not about strict liability, but because it 
fails to recognize the appropriate factors for a risk-benefit test for design 
defects. That criticism, however, stemmed from my failure to appreciate 
the founders’ conception of a defect—because I was so imbued with the 
modern model of three distinct bases for defect. Now, with a better 
understanding of the founders’ conception, Wade’s factors make far 
more sense. Let me explain. 
My criticism of Wade’s factors was that they failed to recognize 
the trade-offs inherent in designing a product and the necessity to 
address, at the margin, the benefits and risks of any change.78 This is the 
contemporary understanding of a design defect that involves a design 
that can be changed in some way to provide greater safety. Rather, 
Wade’s factors focus on the characteristics of the product itself, its social 
utility and dangers, instead of honing in on the risks that can be 
eliminated by changing the product’s design and the costs of doing so. 
Thus, I had claimed that social utility—Wade’s first factor—of, say, an 
AIDS vaccine—is irrelevant to the matter of its defective design:  
[I]magine that we have identified a one hundred percent effective vaccine for 
AIDS. Suppose the vaccine causes a mild auto-immune reaction—a rash that 
lasts for a week—in one out of a million persons who take the vaccine. The 
side effect can be eliminated by changing one of the inert ingredients with 
  
 77 Id. at 835. To be fair, within a page, Wade concedes that the evidence sufficient to 
prove a design defect would also be sufficient to prove negligence in the design of the products and 
that the only basis on which strict products liability differs from negligence is with regard to 
manufacturing defects. See id. at 836. 
 78 Those factors are: 
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product—its utility to the user and to the public 
as a whole. 
(2) The safety aspects of the product—the likelihood that it will cause injury, and the 
probable seriousness of the injury. 
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same need and not be as 
unsafe. 
(4) The manufacturer’s ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product without 
impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its utility. 
(5) The user’s ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the product. 
(6) The user’s anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and their 
avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the obvious condition of the 
product, or of the existence of suitable warnings or instructions. 
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss by setting the 
price of the product or carrying liability insurance. 
Wade, supra note 71, at 837-38; see also Wade, supra note 68, at 17 (providing a similar list of 
factors to be employed in a risk-benefit balancing but that omit the loss-spreading criterion). 
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which the vaccine is coated to another inert ingredient, no more expensive and 
equally adept at serving its purpose. The vaccine is defectively designed despite 
its enormous social utility. Risk-benefit analysis operates at the margin—the 
utility of the existing design compared to the alternative—not at the level of the 
entire product.79 
I still think that is correct, but I now appreciate Wade and the 
other founders’ perspectives.80 They were not thinking about marginal 
design changes in a product. Rather, their conception of strict liability 
was based on products whose risks in the course of the ordinary use of 
the product were so serious that liability was legitimately imposed on the 
manufacturer. This is much more like the standard imposed by implied 
warranty, which although under-theorized in the context of products 
causing physical harm, relies on the idea that a product should not cause 
unexpected serious harm in normal use or utterly fail in its essential 
purpose, causing physical injury. 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Anderson-
Weber, Inc.81 illustrates this conception of defect. It is not only 
instructive, but exemplifies the kinds of cases in which implied warranty 
was employed to impose strict liability. A car that was ten days old and 
had been driven 300 miles caught fire while being driven, allegedly as 
the result of a short circuit in the electrical system.82 The plaintiff relied 
on implied warranty and, after surveying cases from New Jersey and 
Tennessee in which brakes and steering failed in new cars, the court 
proclaimed: “Brakes should not be defective from the beginning. 
Steering mechanism should not fail, nor cars burn up within 10 days. 
When such things happen and there is evidence as to the cause, courts 
should be reluctant to deny the purchaser the right to submit his claim to 
a jury.”83 Beyond State Farm, there are a multitude of cases prior to the 
Restatement (Second) and dating back at least to the early part of the 
twentieth century in which courts recognized the use of an implied 
warranty theory for a product that failed to perform safely in its intended 
use. Those courts exhibited indifference to the source of the defect; in 
many of them it is difficult to determine from the court’s description of 
the facts whether the source of the defect was one of design or 
manufacture. The issue was whether the product performed with 
adequate safety—in most of the reported cases, the products failed 
abysmally.84 
  
 79 Green, supra note 75, at 619. 
 80 Professor Priest similarly misunderstood Wade and his test for strict liability, 
criticizing it for failing to appreciate the need for an alternative design by which to frame the risk-
utility analysis. See Priest, supra note 6, at 2325-26.  
 81 110 N.W.2d 449 (Iowa 1961). 
 82  Id. at 452. 
 83 Id. at 456. The court was concerned with proof of the fire’s cause because the 
defendant presented a theory that the fire was caused by events unrelated to a defect in the car. Id. 
 84 See, e.g., Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78, 81 (D. Haw. 1961) (hula skirt that 
burst into flames and burned 75% of plaintiff’s body); McBurnette v. Playground Equip. Corp., 137 
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In summary, the academics interested in products liability in the 
run-up to section 402A were most concerned with the contractual 
impediments to liability that they sought to sweep away. Priest is right 
about that. There was less attention to the standard of liability that any 
strict liability theory might impose. Generally, the focus was on the 
extent of danger posed by the product and when it exceeded some 
threshold—”unreasonable,” for instance, or “extrahazardous”—a defect 
(whether in negligence or warranty) existed that would subject the seller 
to liability. Although courts were confronted with design defect cases 
and at least some academics were writing about them, the source of the 
defect—whether manufacturing, informational, or design—was not a 
significant concern, regardless of the theory of liability being asserted.85 
Thus, Priest’s thesis, which relies on a clear dichotomy between 
manufacturing defect and design defect cases, does not fit well with the 
evidence that exists. And because the focus was on the dangerousness of 
the product, the founders, by and large, did not address the question of 
how to apply this new strict products liability to a claim that a product 
should have employed an alternative and marginally safer design.86 
This appreciation for the early conception of defect explains why 
the California Supreme Court, in Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.,87 felt no 
need to elaborate about what constituted a defect, even if the defect may 
have stemmed from the product’s design. In Cronin, bread trays secured 
in racks in the back of a truck came loose in an accident and due to 
sudden deceleration of the truck were driven forward, struck the 
plaintiff-driver, and propelled him through the windshield.88 The trays 
were released because the safety hasp designed to hold the trays in place 
was defective.89 In the course of holding that a jury should not be 
  
So. 2d 563, 564 (Fla. 1962) (sharp piece on playground equipment amputated three-year-old’s 
finger); McCabe v. L. K. Liggett Drug Co., 112 N.E.2d 254, 257 (Mass. 1953) (coffee maker 
exploded in plaintiff’s face); Bruns v. Jordan Marsh Co., 26 N.E.2d 368, 373 (Mass. 1940) (heel 
separated from plaintiff’s shoe as she descended staircase); Souden v. Fore River Shipbuilding Co., 
112 N.E. 82, 84 (Mass. 1916) (“The fact that the explosion occurred while the boiler was subject to 
the use for which it was designed is of itself evidence of a defective condition.”); DiVello v. Gardner 
Mach. Co., 102 N.E.2d 289, 293 (Ohio C.P. 1951) (grinder disintegrated in hands of Plaintiff during 
normal use). 
 85 See, e.g., Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 33 Cal. Rptr. 175, 180-81 (Ct. App. 1963) 
(braking system permitted inadvertent activation of brakes), rev’d in part, 391 P.2d 168 (Cal. 1964); 
Mathews v. Lawnlite Co., 88 So. 2d 299, 300-01 (Fla. 1956) (rocking lounge-chair had piece 
underneath armrest that amputated portion of user’s finger); see also David G. Owen, The Puzzle of 
Comment j, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1377, 1378 (2004). 
 86 My reading of the negligent design cases of the day is that they did not employ a 
rigorous risk-utility test to claims that a safer alternative design should have been employed. Courts 
took a host of avenues that short-circuited such claims rather than permitting a jury determination. 
See Noel, supra note 29, at 866-77. 
 87 501 P.2d 1153 (Cal. 1972). 
 88  Id. at 1155. 
 89 The metal in the safety hasp was porous and pitted, suggesting a manufacturing defect. 
Id. at 1156. Yet the court never described the case as one involving a manufacturing defect, and, in 
the course of declining to distinguish between the two sources of defects, recognized that the safety 
hasp defect could have been either a design or manufacturing defect, depending on what the 
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instructed in terms of section 402A’s “unreasonably dangerous” 
language, the Court stated that all the jury need decide and be instructed 
about is whether a defect existed.90 No further elaboration of the concept 
of a defect was required. That was true either for manufacturing or 
design defects. But the reason the court could conclude that is because its 
conception of defect was the same one on which the founders were 
operating as well: Did the product fail to perform as would be expected? 
Whether the source of this failure was design or manufacture was not 
important. 
The idea that defectiveness was based on the product containing 
an unacceptable level of (latent)91 risk when used in its intended fashion, 
regardless of the source of the risk, provides a better explanation of 
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.92 than Priest’s treatment. 
Greenman, of course, is the case in which Justice Traynor persuaded the 
remainder of the California Supreme Court to adopt the strict products 
liability for which he had advocated in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling 
Co.93 There were two defects alleged by the plaintiff in Greenman. One 
was that inadequate set screws were employed to hold parts of a lathe 
together, enabling stock on which the plaintiff was working to be thrown 
from the machine, injuring him.94 The other was that there were better 
ways of fastening the parts together than using set screws.95 Inadequate 
set screws, of course, could stem either from a manufacturing defect or a 
design defect and is thus ambiguous. But a better way to hold the 
machine parts together could only be a design defect. Perhaps that is why 
Justice Traynor, in his opinion, described the strict liability being 
adopted as encompassing “a defect in design and manufacture.”96  
Priest claims, as a result of Justice Traynor’s 1965 article, that 
Greenman was a manufacturing defect case.97 Priest also asserts that 
Traynor’s view was that section 402A was limited to manufacturing 
  
manufacturer’s specifications for the metal were. Id. at 1163. The court quoted testimony of an 
expert, which suggests that this was a manufacturing defect not a design defect. See id. at 1157 (“[I]t 
was just a very, very bad piece of metal. Simply would not stand any force—reasonable forces at 
all.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 90  See id. at 1157. 
 91 I employ the parenthetical here because it is plain that hidden danger was an important 
component of these early conceptions of defectiveness, especially ones informed by implied 
warranty. Yet that view was by no means unanimous and inroads on the “open and obvious” defense 
began early in the strict products liability day. See, e.g., Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 467 P.2d 229, 
234-35 (Cal. 1970). 
 92 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963). 
 93 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944). 
 94  Greenman, 377 P.2d at 899. 
 95  Id. 
 96 Id. at 901. Moreover, Greenman was understood as applying strict liability to 
manufacturing defects and design defects. BAJI 218-A (currently BAJI 9.00), the strict-liability 
approved instruction that was drafted to reflect Greenman, provides for liability for defects in the 
manufacture or design of a product. Cal. Civil Jury Instructions § 9.00 (2008).  
 97 See Priest, supra note 6, at 2315, 2321-22 & n.79. 
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defect cases.98 Priest concludes that the disjunction between Traynor’s 
view and his description in Greenman of the lathe containing defects “in 
design and manufacture” results from the failure of those like Traynor to 
focus on design deficiencies as a source of defect.99 I do not disagree that 
the founders had not thought deeply about the appropriate standard for a 
design defect—as I explained above, Cronin is evidence that that was 
true of at least one leading court. Yet, Priest infers that the intent was to 
limit strict liability to manufacturing defects. I think a better inference 
from the evidence is that at this stage in the strict products liability 
reform, sorting out the source of the defect did not matter. Commercial 
products implicitly are safe for the jobs for which they are intended, and 
when they are not and cause harm to a consumer, strict liability should 
ensue.100 
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.101 is the other classic pre-
section 402A strict liability case.102 Based on a theory of implied 
warranty rather than strict tort, the New Jersey Supreme Court focused 
on stripping away the impediments that most commentators had been 
writing about, including privity and disclaimers. In Henningsen, an 
almost brand-new car, with less than five-hundred miles on its odometer, 
suddenly made a ninety degree turn and crashed into a wall.103 
Henningsen appears clearly to involve a manufacturing defect. Yet there 
is nothing explicit nor indeed any indication in the case that the court 
thought its decision was so limited. At no point does the court use the 
term “manufacturing defect.” In responding to the defendant’s claim that 
there was insufficient proof of breach of the implied warranty, the court 
revealed its conception of a defect by explaining that the circumstances 
of the accident justified a finding of the “unsuitability for ordinary use” 
of the product.104 In a case that was explicitly one about implied 
warranty, upon which section 402A’s standard for strict liability was 
based, the concern that emerges is the extent of danger of a product in 
ordinary use, rather than a deviation from the norm established by other 
products of the manufacturer in the same line. 
  
 98  Id. at 2315. 
 99  Id. at 2315 n.60 (quoting Greenman, 377 P.2d at 901) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
 100 Greenman, 377 P.2d at 901.  
 101 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960). 
 102 Professor Priest identifies Greenman and Henningsen as the two critical cases leading 
to the advent of strict products liability. See Priest, supra note 20, at 507. 
 103  Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 75. 
 104 Id. at 98. The court wrote:  
The facts, detailed above, show that on the day of the accident, ten days after delivery, 
Mrs. Henningsen was driving in a normal fashion, on a smooth highway, when 
unexpectedly the steering wheel and the front wheels of the car went into the bizarre 
action described. Can it reasonably be said that the circumstances do not warrant an 
inference of unsuitability for ordinary use against the manufacturer and the dealer?  
Id.  
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B.  The Structure of Section 402A 
Professor Priest’s structural argument proceeds quickly past the 
black letter language of section 402A, acknowledges that the two most 
salient comments are ambiguous about which kinds of defects are 
included,105 finds supportive evidence in two other comments, and 
ultimately relies on the numerous examples contained in the 
comments.106 Of the fifty-four examples in which the fact or possibility 
of a product defect is adverted to, Priest finds that thirty-seven involved 
manufacturing defects, eleven were about unavoidably unsafe products 
and therefore did not implicate a type of defect, and six were of uncertain 
source as to the defect.107  
However, before examining Professor Priest’s evidence, let us 
tarry on the black letter of section 402A, which requires that a product be 
in a “defective condition unreasonably dangerous” for strict liability to 
be imposed.108 Early drafts of section 402A imposed strict liability when 
food was in a “condition dangerous to the consumer.”109 Dean Prosser 
explained the evolution of this language to the final “defective condition 
unreasonably dangerous” language at the ALI annual meeting in 1961, 
when a motion was made to delete the “defective condition” language. In 
the ensuing debate, Prosser added that the original language, employing 
“dangerous,” had been modified to add “defective condition” to ward off 
concerns that what are now known as unavoidably unsafe products 
would be subject to strict liability merely because they posed some 
significant, yet irremediable, risk.110  
  
 105 Priest, supra note 6, at 2318. 
 106 Id. at 2319 (“The strongest evidence that the founders focused exclusively on strict 
liability for manufacturing defects is that they did not present a single example in the Comments of 
an alterative strict liability application.”).  
 107 Id. I do not find this enumeration of types of defects contained in the discussion in the 
comments persuasive. First, the point of the discussion is not, contrary to Priest, to explain the “types 
of cases to which the strict liability standard was meant to apply,” in the sense of the types of defects 
to which section 402A applied. Id. Nothing in the commentary addresses the types of defects to 
which section 402A “applied.” Second, many of the examples are of non-defective products, as in 
comment h, which refers to a “bottled beverage knocked against a radiator to remove the cap,” food 
to which too much salt has been added by the user, or over-consumption of candy by a child, or in 
comment f, which uses the example of a neighbor who sells a jar of jam to explain who is in the 
“business of selling,” as required by the black letter. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A 
cmts. f, h (1965). Counting those examples as suggesting that section 402A is limited to 
manufacturing defects is silly. Third, there are, as Professor Priest acknowledges, several examples 
in which the defect is of uncertain origin. Id. Fourth, Professor Priest’s count is at least modestly 
padded in his favor. He counts a reference, in comment f, to the owner of an automobile who resells 
it as reflecting a manufacturing defect, when the text is insufficient to draw any conclusion about the 
source of the defect. Priest, supra note 6, at 2320. Finally, whatever slim evidence this provides is 
overwhelmed by the other language and structure of section 402A discussed in the text.  
 108  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). 
 109 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (Prelim. Draft No. 6, 1958).  
 110 The following colloquy took place: 
DEAN PROSSER: Mr. Dickerson has stated an original point of view which I first 
brought into the Council of The American Law Institute in connection with this section. 
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Thus, the key operative language in section 402A is the word 
“dangerous,” rather than the “defective condition” language, which 
showed up only to address a narrow class of cases, such as knives, butter, 
and whiskey, that have dangers built in that cannot be removed. That the 
focus was on danger reveals that Prosser was focused not on the 
condition or source of the risk in the product. Thus, section 402A’s 
premise was that products that, in the ordinary course of their use, caused 
harm to users because of the extent of danger they posed were subject to 
strict liability. “Defective” might have been a reference to a deviation 
from the norm meant by the manufacturer—a manufacturing defect—but 
its inclusion later in the ALI process reveals that it had both a narrower 
and more stylized purpose than adverting to manufacturing defects. 
Moreover, the adoption of consumer expectations as the standard 
for determining when a product was subject to strict liability reflects the 
contract heritage of section 402A and the contribution of implied 
warranty as the basis for strict liability. The parties’ intent and 
expectations are a contract concept and displace fault as the basis for 
determining the content of a contract and whether it was breached. And, 
as suggested above, the implied warranty cases involving personal injury 
are concerned with unexpected and unacceptable danger in a product, 
  
“[F]ood in a condition unreasonably* dangerous to the consumer” was my language. The 
Council then proceeded to raise the question of a number of products which, even though 
not defective, are in fact dangerous to the consumer—whiskey, for example [laughter]; 
cigarettes, which cause lung cancer; various types of drugs which can be administered 
with safety up to a point but may be dangerous if carried beyond that—and they raised 
the question whether “unreasonably dangerous” was sufficient to protect the defendant 
against possible liability in such cases. 
Therefore, they suggested that there must be something wrong with the product itself, and hence the 
word “defective” was put in; but the fact that the product is dangerous, or even unreasonably 
dangerous to people who consume it is not enough. There has to be something wrong with the 
product.  
Now, I was rather indifferent to that. I thought “unreasonably dangerous,” on the other 
hand, carried every meaning that was necessary, as Mr. Dickerson does; but I could see 
the point, so I accepted the change. “Defective” was put in to head off liability on the part 
of the seller of whiskey . . . . 
. . . 
PRESIDENT TWEED: The motion is to eliminate “defective” in the black letter . . . . 
. . .  
PRESIDENT TWEED: The noes seem to me to have it.  
38 ALI Proceedings 86-89 (1961), reprinted in W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND 
SAFETY: CASES AND MATERIALS 223-25 (2d ed. 1989). Prosser’s statement that the “unreasonably” 
language was in his original draft is incorrect. The first draft, in 1958, subjected food “in a condition 
dangerous to the consumer” to strict liability. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (Prelim. 
Draft No. 6, 1958). “Dangerous” was first modified with “unreasonably” at the same time as 
“defective condition” was added and contained in the Tentative Draft that was the subject of the 
discussion set out above. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (Tentative Draft No. 6, 1961). 
Richard Wright thus gets it backward in his claim that the “unreasonably dangerous” language was 
included to address unavoidably unsafe products. Wright, supra note 8, at 1069. 
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regardless of whether it stems from a manufacturing, design, or 
informational deficiency.  
If strict liability were limited to manufacturing defects, there 
would have been no need for consumer expectations to be employed in 
section 402A. Manufacturing defects can readily be determined by 
reference to other identical products and whether the questioned product 
deviated from all of those others. If so, it is subject to strict liability. That 
is precisely the way in which the Restatement (Third) imposes strict 
liability for manufacturing defects, eschewing any reference to consumer 
expectations in the definition or description of a manufacturing defect.111 
Consumer expectations are a warranty and product-performance 
standard, not a standard designed to assess a specific kind of defect.  
Aspects of the commentary to section 402A beyond the black 
letter and consumer-expectations standard for determining defect also 
contradict the idea that manufacturing defects were the exclusive subject 
for strict liability. Comment k, addressing unavoidably unsafe products, 
belies that section 402A was limited to manufacturing defects. If it were, 
there would have been no need for comment k to address unavoidably 
unsafe products—those products are by definition ones in which the 
danger exists in all such products as an inherent quality of the product.112 
The same is true of comment j, which covers the requirement of warning 
for products such as those in comment k that pose generic dangers to 
users.113 Comment k also reveals that the American Law Institute had no 
difficulty communicating that a class of products posing danger were not 
subject to section 402A’s strict liability.114 Yet, there is no comparable 
comment excluding design or informational inadequacies from the strict 
liability of section 402A.115 
  
 111 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(a) (1998); see also Page Keeton, 
Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY’S L.J. 30, 38-39 (1973) (observing that 
“virtually any fabrication or construction defect” would be “unreasonably dangerous as a matter of 
law”). 
 112 Professor Priest does not address comment k in his structural analysis of section 402A. 
Priest, supra note 6, at 2317-24. He does, however, state at the outset that there are several passages 
“susceptible to more expansive interpretations of strict liability,” but none of the ones he 
subsequently discusses includes the language in comment k. Id. at 2318; see also Schwartz, supra 
note 8, at 947 n.185 (“If the Restatement had no intention of applying to design issues, there would 
have been no need for comment k, on ‘unavoidably unsafe products.’”); Ellen Wertheimer, 
Calabresi’s Razor: A Short Cut to Responsibility, 28 STETSON L. REV. 105, 116 n.35 (1998) 
(“Finally, sections such as comments j and k, which deal with defects other than those in 
manufacture, would have been unnecessary . . . .”). 
 113 Comment i, as well, speaks to everyday products and the universal risks that are posed 
by their use in the course of explaining that they are not unreasonably dangerous. See Henderson & 
Twerski, Achieving Consensus, supra note 35, at 879-80. 
 114  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965).  
 115 Priest makes the complementary point that the comments do not contain a “single 
example . . . of an alternative [to manufacturing defects] strict liability application.” Priest, supra 
note 6, at 2319. The reason is that, as already observed, Prosser and the other founders were not 
thinking in terms of subcategorizing defects. The fact that, by Priest’s count, there are six examples 
of product defects that were of uncertain source is additional evidence of the lack of attention to and 
concern about the defects’ sources. Id. 
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Professor Priest finds language in comment h supportive. 
Comment h states that the defective condition of a product “may arise 
not only from harmful ingredients, not characteristic of the product itself, 
either as to presence or quantity, but also from foreign objects contained 
in the product, from decay or deterioration before sale, or from the way 
the product is prepared or packed.”116 This language, Priest explains, is 
exemplary of different ways that a manufacturing defect may exist, with 
only the possible exception of the “quantity” idea.117 That is true, but it is 
also insignificant when one considers the source of this language. It first 
appeared in the earliest Preliminary Draft of section 402A, which applied 
only to food products.118 The source of defects in food surely was 
classical manufacturing defects. But food is not “designed” in the way 
that durable goods are, and so we would not have expected a strict 
liability provision applicable only to food to advert to the way that a 
product—say, a lawn chair that rocks—might be defective because a 
metal piece, sharp as a guillotine blade, is underneath the arm rest and 
slices off a user’s finger.119 
Another indication that there was no conscious decision to limit 
section 402A to manufacturing defects is that it contains references to the 
necessity of providing warnings. Failure to provide these warnings, when 
required, renders the seller subject to liability under section 402A. Thus, 
section 402A suggests that informational inadequacies can, in 
themselves, constitute a defective condition unreasonably dangerous.120 
Comment j, titled “Directions or warning,” states flat out that “[i]n order 
to prevent the product from being unreasonably dangerous, the seller 
may be required to give directions or warning . . . .” To be sure, liability 
for these informational inadequacies does not look very strict—there is 
no mention of dispensing with the negligence requirement of 
foreseeability, the context is often one in which the manufacturer would 
have knowledge, and, in one instance, the warning obligation is 
explicitly conditioned on seller anticipation of the danger. Professor 
Priest only refers to comment j, calling it “peculiar” and dismissing it 
because all of the examples it discusses involve unavoidably unsafe 
products.121 Yes, but comment j is not about only unavoidably unsafe 
products, and its first sentence, quoted above, is not qualified in that 
respect. Comment k is about unavoidably unsafe products and has its 
own reference to the requirement that that class of products be 
accompanied with proper warnings. 
  
 116  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, cmt. h (1965). 
 117  Priest, supra note 6, at 2318. 
 118 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. c (Prelim. Draft No. 6, 1958). 
 119 See Matthews v. Lawnlite Co., 88 So. 2d 299, 300 (Fla. 1956). 
 120 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmts. h, j, & k (1965). 
 121  Priest, supra note 6, 2323.  
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Professor Priest’s final argument based on structure stems from 
the treatment of contributory negligence in comment n, which denies any 
defense based on certain negligent conduct of the plaintiff.122 Professor 
Priest finds this denial “peculiar” because from the perspective of the 
modern law and economics movement, contributory negligence is an 
important adjunct to obtaining the efficiency provided by strict liability 
so that consumers have adequate incentives to avoid injuries for which 
they are the cheaper cost avoiders.123 Yet, Priest reasons, if strict liability 
under section 402A is limited to manufacturing defects, then there is 
little need for consumer incentives since there is little that a consumer 
can do to avoid harm from a latent manufacturing defect that is 
unknown.124 Denying contributory negligence in section 402A, thus, can 
be squared with economic efficiency. 
That the law and economics movement developed well after 
section 402A had been drafted, debated, and published125 goes 
unappreciated and unmentioned by Professor Priest. That tort law might 
not be cast purely in terms of economic efficiency, even after those ideas 
moved from the academy to the courts, similarly escapes Professor 
Priest’s argument. That, in fact, contributory negligence was not a 
defense to other strict liability claims when section 402A was adopted 
also goes unrecognized in Priest’s treatment.126 Finally, Professor Priest’s 
claims about comment n ignore a critical flaw in the economics’ claim 
for the need for contributory negligence to insure victim care.127 
  
 122 We need not tarry on the scope of conduct encompassed by comment n, which is not 
as broad as the holdings in cases cited by Professor Priest, because the breadth of comment n is 
unimportant to the issue raised by Priest’s treatment. 
 123 Priest, supra note 6, at 2322-23. 
 124  See id. 
 125 Richard Posner’s first crack at explaining the Hand test in terms of economic 
efficiency was in 1972. See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972). 
The following year was his first treatment of strict liability. See Richard A. Posner, Strict Liability: A 
Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 205 (1973). Calabresi’s The Cost of Accidents was published in 1970, 
five years after section 402A. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970).  
 126 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 515, 524 (1977) (paralleling comment n 
denying a claim for unreasonable conduct but providing a defense based on knowingly and 
unreasonably assuming the risk). 
 127  The flaw is that there are other, more powerful incentives for protection of self against 
personal injury than liability incentives, predominantly the risk of pain, suffering, and even death. 
See Gary T. Schwartz, Contributory and Comparative Negligence: A Reappraisal, 87 YALE L.J. 697, 
704-27 (1978) (explaining the non-financial incentives for taking care to avoid physical injury to 
oneself). In 1986, in the third edition of his book, Judge Posner nodded in the direction of this 
criticism, acknowledging that damages may not provide full compensation for personal injuries and 
that potential victims may therefore have an unspecified “incentive” to take care even if tort law 
does not sanction their unreasonable behavior. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 
154 (3d ed. 1986). Similarly, Steve Shavell recognizes that if victims “would not or could not be 
fully compensated for . . . serious personal injury or death,” they would “have an incentive to take 
care” independent of tort law. STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 11 n.9 
(1987). 
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IV.  THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD)’S TREATMENT OF DESIGN 
DEFECTS RECONSIDERED 
I had not intended to spend so much of this paper attending to 
Professor Priest’s manufacturing defect hypothesis. The more I read, 
however, the more intriguing his claim and evidence became. The more I 
explored, the more convinced I became that the founders and section 
402A were concerned not about specific kinds of defects and their 
amenability to strict liability, but about products that were excessively 
dangerous. As I have attempted to show, the evidence in support of that 
proposition is quite overwhelming, and there is almost nothing, upon 
careful examination, supporting the idea that section 402A was meant to 
be limited to manufacturing defects.  
However, the fact that section 402A was not limited to design 
defects does not mean, as stated earlier, that it adopted a consumer 
expectations test for design defects, as others have suggested.128 
Returning to where we began and where I found common ground with 
Professor Priest, the founders, with their focus on products that 
performed in an excessively dangerous manner, just were not thinking 
about marginal safety improvements or that failure to employ an 
alternative design might be the basis for strict liability. Nor did they 
consider the propriety of consumer expectations in deciding such cases. 
Almost a decade after section 402A was approved and after early real 
design defect cases were emerging, John Wade remained concerned with 
defects of the implied warranty variety—products that contained 
excessive or unreasonable danger, regardless of the source of the 
danger.129 
Yet the difficulties of a consumer expectations test for designs at 
the margin have been well documented. Once the strict products liability 
movement got going after section 402A was published, cases that 
presented the issue of “how safe is enough?” began emerging. And 
courts began expressing concerns about the use of consumer expectations 
when consumer expectations about the matter were indeterminate or non-
existent, leaving resolution of the matter of defect entirely to the 
unencumbered judgment of the jury.130 
Once again, the California experience is revealing. Six years 
after Cronin, the California Supreme Court was confronted with a case, 
  
 128 See supra text accompanying notes 12-15. Bill Powers explains the difficulties and 
waning influence of the consumer expectations test as more difficult design defect cases became a 
staple of products liability litigation. See William Powers, Jr., A Modest Proposal to Abandon Strict 
Products Liability, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 639, 646, 653-54. Although he focuses more on complex 
designs than on difficult determinations about whether the safety performance of the product was 
deficient, his analysis and explanation of why courts have moved away from it is illuminating.  
 129 See supra text accompanying notes 78-80. 
 130 See, e.g., Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 435 P.2d 806, 807-09 (Or. 1967) (pickup truck 
that had wheel come apart after hitting a rock five or six inches in diameter).  
2009] CONGRUITY OF SECOND AND THIRD TORTS RESTATEMENTS 833 
Barker v. Lull Engineering Inc.,131 in which the plaintiff explicitly 
asserted that a high-lift loader, used at a construction site, should have 
had several improvements to its design to make it safer.132 The context 
was not a routine construction-site environment, but one where the 
loader would be used on sloping ground and was therefore more 
susceptible to tipping.133 The plaintiff was injured when, in the course of 
lifting a load of lumber, the loader tipped over.134 Reaffirming its 
decision in Cronin that section 402A’s “unreasonably dangerous” 
language should not be used in charging a jury on strict products 
liability, the court nevertheless recognized the need for some guidance to 
be provided to the jury on the matter of how safe a product need be 
designed. The court provided a dual-disjunctive standard for determining 
defectiveness in a design case.135 The first adopted the Greenman 
performance-based consumer expectations standard.136 As the court 
recognized, this standard for defectiveness will often be proved by 
circumstantial evidence bearing on the accident that occurred, rather than 
proof of the specific defect.137 The second test for defectiveness entailed 
proof, based on a balancing of the risks of the existing design compared 
to the greater safety of an alternative design with the utility or benefits of 
the existing design compared to the alternative design.138 
By 1994, however, the court appreciated the indeterminacy of 
consumer expectations for marginal design defect claims. In Soule v. 
General Motors Corp.,139 the plaintiff was hurt in an automobile accident 
when the toepan beneath her feet was crushed rapidly backwards in the 
collision.140 Among the defects alleged by plaintiff was the design of the 
frame, which permitted the toepan to be rapidly deflected toward the 
driver.141 But a collision with a closing speed between thirty and seventy 
miles per hour just does not afford any basis for determining how well an 
automobile should protect a driver against rapidly deflecting parts. The 
circumstances of this accident just did not permit an inference of a defect 
in the car. The court declared that consumer expectations, in this 
  
 131 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978). 
 132 Plaintiff’s expert identified several improvements in the loader’s design whose 
absence allegedly made it defective: (1) equipping it with outriggers so that it would be steadier, 
especially on sloping ground; (2) providing a roll bar and seat belt for the operator; (3) improving 
the leveling control provided for the operator; and (4) including a “park” position on the loader’s 
transmission. Id. at 447-48.  
 133  Id. at 447. 
 134 Id. 
 135  Id. at 452. 
 136  Id. at 454. 
 137 Id. Yet it seemed to be inapplicable in Barker. The regular operator of the loader 
called in sick on the day that plaintiff was injured because he thought the sloping ground and narrow 
base of the loader were incompatible, creating a dangerous situation. Id. at 448 n.2. 
 138 Id. at 454-55.  
 139 882 P.2d 298 (Cal.1994). 
 140  Id. at 301. 
 141  Id. at 302. 
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situation, could not be used to determine if the car was defective.142 Use 
of consumer expectations had to be limited. Although the court’s 
explanation referred to complex designs as being beyond the ken of a 
jury,143 it was not the complexity of the automobile’s design that 
presented the problem. Rather, it was that the performance of the 
automobile, under the circumstances, was not such that an inference of 
defect was possible.144 On the other hand, if the same automobile with the 
same complexity of design exploded while idling at a traffic light, the 
court acknowledged that consumer expectations would permit a finding 
of defect.145 Thus, the court left difficult marginal design defect claims to 
be resolved by the risk-benefit prong of Barker, while preserving 
consumer expectations for the performance-based failure to provide a 
floor of safety that all products should provide and that were, in my 
assessment, the focus of section 402A.146 
The Restatement (Third) reflects these lessons learned with the 
emergence of marginal design defect claims and yet, in my judgment, 
remains true to section 402A’s conception of defect, contrary to some 
critics. In section 2(b), the Restatement provides a risk-utility standard 
for design defects. This is a negligence standard, pure and simple, given 
its requirement that the risks be foreseeable.147 At the same time, section 
3 contains an alternative formulation for finding a defect—an alternative 
that is roughly congruent with the “excessively dangerous” conception of 
defect contained in section 402A.148 Although couched as the strict 
liability analog to res ipsa loquitur and often referred to as the 
“malfunction theory” of defect, this section encompasses the kinds of 
cases that were the model for section 402A: a brand-new car that takes 
an uncommanded right turn and crashes into an obstacle; a rocking 
lounge chair that cuts off a user’s finger; or a power tool that fails 
adequately to hold stock in place. Interestingly, two of these examples 
appear as Illustrations to section 3 in the Restatement (Third), yet are 
drawn from the facts of the two classic cases supporting section 402A.149 
  
 142  Id. at 301. 
 143  Id. at 308. 
 144 See Powers, supra note 128, at 646 (noting that “it is difficult to ascertain consumer 
expectations in all but the simplest cases”). 
 145 Soule, 882 P.2d at 308 n.3. 
 146  Id. at 308-09. 
 147 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) (1998). The balancing of risks 
and benefits is obscured because it is not explicitly stated in the black letter of section 2(b). 
Comment f clarifies the essential inquiry, a balancing of the safety benefits of the alternative design 
with its costs and other disadvantages compared to the actual design. 
 148 Id. § 3 (1998). I do not want to overstate the equivalence of section 3 of the 
Restatement (Third) and section 402’s concept of defect that I have explained in this Article. I have 
not, at this point, thought through all of the issues that are implicated. We will also need more 
opportunity to see how courts interpret and apply section 3 before a final judgment is appropriate.  
 149 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 3 illus. 5, 7 (1998). That Illustration 
7 does not result in liability does not diminish the point, as the reason for non-liability is that the 
source of the defect was equally probably the result of someone other than the seller.  
2009] CONGRUITY OF SECOND AND THIRD TORTS RESTATEMENTS 835 
To the Reporters’ credit, in the midst of their drafting and facing 
heavy criticism over their adoption of a risk-utility test for design 
defects, they modified section 3 in an important respect. In Council Draft 
No. 1, the predecessor to section 3 provided that an inference could be 
drawn when the circumstances were such that the malfunction “was 
caused by a manufacturing defect.”150 This section remained limited to 
manufacturing defects through Tentative Draft No. 1, but in subsequent 
drafts and the final version was extended to design defects as well.151 
Notably, one version of this section revealed its kinship with the 
performance-based standard for dangerous product defects in section 
402A by explaining that it was available when a product failed “to 
function as a reasonable person would expect” and caused harm in a 
manner justifying an inference that a defect was responsible.152 Although 
discarding the warranty “consumer” from the consumer expectations test 
and substituting the tort “reasonable person,” the relationship between 
section 402A in the Restatement (Second) and section 3 in the 
Restatement (Third) is plain.153 
Just as section 402A was indifferent to the source of the defect, 
section 3 is indifferent to whether the misperformance is due to design or 
manufacturing. Indeed, I take it that, even if we know the source of the 
defect, a plaintiff may rely on section 3 if the circumstances of the 
accident justify the inference of defect contemplated by that section. 
Thus, to return to Matthews v. Lawnlite Co.,154 the case in which a lounge 
chair amputated the user’s finger, even if we knew that the source of the 
defect was one of design, a plaintiff would be able to pursue a section 3 
claim and would not be required to prove a reasonable alternative design 
under section 2(b).155 
  
 150 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 102 (Council Draft No. 1, 1993). 
 151 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 3 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 
1995); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 3 (1998). 
 152  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 3 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1994). 
 153 The final version of section 3 became the product liability analog of res ipsa loquitur, 
eliminating any perspective and relying on the circumstances of the harm-causing incident for an 
inference that a product defect, rather than some other cause, was responsible. See RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 3 (1998). 
 154  88 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1956). 
 155  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 3 cmt. b (1998). Comment b is 
muddled in its treatment of this issue. It states that a plaintiff injured by a plane whose wings 
suddenly fall off may know that it was due to design, but when the circumstances justify an 
inference of defect under section 3, “it should not be necessary for the plaintiff to incur the cost of 
proving whether the failure resulted from a manufacturing defect or from a defect in the design of 
the product.” Id. But the issue in the plane crash case is not whether the plaintiff should incur the 
cost of identifying the source of the defect; the issue is whether the plaintiff, when the source of the 
defect is known to be one of design, is limited to section 2(b), the design defect standard. However, 
comment b to section 2 of the Restatement (Third) makes clear that section 3 is an alternative 
method of proving a design defect. See also Henderson & Twerski, Achieving Consensus, supra note 
35, at 906 (“Inferences of defect based on product malfunction obviate the need to apply the general 
design standard, thereby rendering that subset of design cases relatively easy to decide.”). 
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This brings me to my conclusion: the Products Liability 
Restatement does not contract the scope of liability for design defects 
from that provided in section 402A. When section 402A was developed, 
there already existed a negligent design cause of action.156 Section 402A, 
without a great deal of consideration of the precise boundaries, added a 
basis for liability for defects that made a product unreasonably 
dangerous.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Section 402A and the scholars and courts that crafted it were 
concerned about easy cases in which products failed in performing at a 
minimal level of safety. Impediments to establishing liability on an 
implied warranty theory were the primary concern. Relevant also were 
difficulties of proof of the elements of negligence, as negligence matured 
into a broad-based theory that could be applied by injured purchasers, 
users, and bystanders against those involved in the manufacture and sale 
of a product. In this era, the type of defect was not important, and the 
founders, although aware of the different ways in which a product might 
be defective, paid little attention to the matter as section 402A was being 
developed. Thus, I do not think that George Priest’s now twenty-year-old 
claim that section 402A was intended to be limited to manufacturing 
defects squares with the available evidence. 
At the same time, the performance-oriented standard adopted 
from the warranty of merchantability proved inadequate to address the 
new kinds of cases that plaintiffs’ lawyers began bringing in the heady 
early days of strict products liability. Cars that crashed were alleged to be 
inadequately designed to provide adequate protection to the occupants. 
Industrial machinery should have been provided with additional 
safeguards to prevent momentary carelessness by an operator from 
resulting in an amputation, even if the employer did not choose to 
purchase such guards. Brakes and steering mechanisms on earth movers 
should have been more effective, permitting the operator to manipulate 
the machinery more nimbly.157 Consumer expectations, which could be 
so readily employed in the classic cases of misperformance that led to the 
adoption of strict products liability, proved inadequate to its task. 
Confronted with the inevitably of tradeoffs in determining how safe a 
product should be designed, a movement toward a risk-utility standard 
began to take hold and was accelerated and confirmed by the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts.  
  
 156 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 398 (1965). To be sure, that negligent 
design cause of action did not require proof of an alternative design, which the Restatement (Third) 
does. Yet, if the design defect is egregious enough (and I do not suspect that there are many products 
in which this is the case), section 3 provides for liability without the need for proof of an alternative 
design. 
 157 See, e.g., Garst v. Gen. Motors Corp. 484 P.2d 47, 62-63 (Kan. 1971).  
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Yet in fashioning a risk-utility test for design defects while 
adopting a separate provision for products whose misperformance is 
sufficiently egregious for liability to be imposed, the Restatement (Third) 
brings us very close to where we were when section 402A was adopted. 
Section 3 of the Restatement (Third) imposes strict liability when a 
product just does not meet minimum standards of safety, and the risk-
utility test of section 2(b) provides a negligent design standard to be 
employed when the issue is how safe products must be designed. Critics 
on both sides of the debate on strict liability and the Restatement 
(Third)’s role have missed its essential role in this return to basics.  
